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<CN>4 
<CT>Interrogating the crisis 
<CST>financial Instruments, public policy and corporate governance 
<CA>Hugh Willmott 
 
<A>Introduction 
<QM> 
There is growing recognition that the dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader 
and more diverse group of investors, rather that warehousing such risks on their 
balance sheets, has helped to make the banking and overall financial system more 
resilient. 
(IMF, 2006, p. 51 cited in MacKenzie, 2009a, p. 73) 
 
What precipitated the global financial crisis of 2008 and why were structures 
of corporate governance unable to avoid or prevent it? The intention of this 
chapter is to offer some partial illumination of these questions by making 
corporate governance its focus. Its premise is that the way financial 
organizations, such as banks and insurance companies, do business, 
including their use of financial instruments, is contingent upon the conception 
and associated structures of corporate governance that are ostensibly 
designed to regulate – enable but also constrain – their activities. 
When reflecting on the role and significance of governance in `the 
corporate failures of the first decade of the 2000s’, Deakin (2011) observes 
that a distinctive form of corporate governance – what he calls ‘shareholder–
value oriented corporate governance’ – ‘provid(ed) an important part of the 
external context of financial instability, and exacerbate[ed] the misalignment of 
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incentives within firms’ (ibid: pp. 34‒5). Shareholder-value oriented corporate 
governance currently defines the parameters of ‘best practice’ by giving 
emphasis to a number of elements: the separation of chair and CEO roles, 
external monitoring, the presence of non-executive directors, and so on (see 
Veldman and Willmott, 2016). These elements, it will be argued, affirm rather 
than restrain, and effectively obscure rather than challenge, a conception of 
the corporation as a nexus of contracts in which, as Deakin (2011, p. 40) puts 
it, the corporate form ‘is seen as an object of financial arbitrage’, rather than, 
say, a legal fiction that is potentially amenable to serving a plurality of 
stakeholders (Stout, 2012). 
The chapter seeks to shed light on why the calculations relating to 
financial products – notably, the rapid growth in securities taking the form of 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that preceded the financial crisis – 
proved to be so recklessly optimistic, abjectly cynical or stunningly naïve. To 
this end, its focus is upon the normalization of the sale of sub-prime 
mortgages and their securitization during the years running up to the crisis. 
On the ‘demand’ side, the chapter attends to deregulation and, more 
specifically, to the relaxation of restrictions – specifically, those associated in 
the US with the reform of the Community Re-investment Act (CRA) – that 
fuelled the sale of huge volumes of sub-prime mortgages. Without the 
participation of previously `redlined’ communities in this market, far fewer sub-
prime mortgages would have been packaged into CDOs. Turning to the 
‘supply’ side of the normalization of the sub-prime mortgage market, I 
emphasize the limitations of the corporate governance of the financial 
institutions engaged in the securitization business. Other studies have 
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highlighted failures of corporate governance in general terms (e.g. Loughrey, 
2013; Vasudev and Watson, 2012; Sun, Stewart and Pollard, 2011). Here I 
take the example of American International Group (AIG), a company that had, 
in many respects, model governance structures, yet was found to be wholly 
incapable of monitoring and restraining its engagement in the writing of credit 
default swaps (CDSs) as hedges against the risks of defaulting CDOs, with 
catastrophic consequences. 
The present analysis shares MacKenzie’s (2009) assessment of the 
central role of CDSs and CDOs, including synthetic CDOs (see Roberts and 
Jones, 2009), in precipitating a financial crisis of such depth and duration. But 
it also qualifies and situates the explosive ‘success’ of these financial 
instruments in relation to other elements that comprised the ‘perfect storm’. I 
focus upon securitization and corporate governance not least because, within 
organization studies, analysis of financial institutions, products and markets is 
disproportionate to their influence. Scholarly consideration of corporate 
governance has been marginalized by regarding it as a specialist domain 
reserved for or monopolized by other academics (e.g. accountants, lawyers 
and behaviourists) rather than as a field of study integral to the analysis of 
organization(s). 
The chapter begins with an overview of the context of the global 
financial crisis (GFC). Its anatomy is then examined, focusing upon the 
centrality of securitization in the meltdown before addressing directly the 
conditions which permitted the huge expansion of the sub-prime mortgage 
market. Having sketched some distinguishing features and backdrop of the 
GFC, attention is directed to the corporate governance of AIG, the firm that 
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received the largest bail-out. It concludes by reflecting upon the centrality of 
the shareholder value model in the run-up to the financial crisis as banks 
sought out new sources of such value in the sub-prime mortgage market and 
suggests that avoidance of a future crisis will require a radical change in the 
principles of corporate governance. 
 
<A>The context 
 
During the decades running up to the financial crisis, a belief in the efficiency 
of markets combined with a shareholder-value oriented conception of 
corporate governance facilitated financially driven growth fuelled by access to 
sources of cheap credit. The ‘new growth model’, which Crouch (2008) has 
characterized as ‘privatized Keynesianism’, provided income streams by 
generating credit from available assets. In the UK context, the model 
promoted a permissive, re-regulation of financial markets which was 
announced in the UK by Big Bang (1986). At the heart of the ‘new growth 
model’ is a faith in markets as efficient allocators of resources and an 
antipathy to interventions by the state, including its regulation of markets that 
must be light-touch and supportive. Concerns about ‘society’ and ‘social 
justice’ are marginalized as they are considered to be misconceived, given 
that the removal of restrictions and the operation of less fettered markets will 
‘lift all boats’ as wealth ‘trickles down’ to benefit everyone. From the 1980s, 
successive administrations in the UK and the US seemed to assume that 
there was problem – such as making home ownership more widely available – 
for which the forces of the market, however convoluted and re-regulated, was 
 5 
not the solution. This philosophy is also evident in a conception of corporate 
governance that treats firms as bundles of assets to be analysed, restructured 
and traded using financial techniques; likewise, executives are incentivized 
with stock options and performance-related bonuses to pursue shareholder 
value maximization (Ezzamel, Veldman and Willmott, 2015; Davis, 2009). 
The chief threat to the ‘new growth model’ was identified as inflation: 
economists, regulators and politicians deemed the rate of inflation to be the 
primary benchmark of economic stability.1 Preoccupied with its control, much 
less attention was paid to other risks, such as those associated with the neo-
liberalization of financial markets and the possibility, however apparently 
remote, of their meltdown. The seemingly limitless expansion of the financial 
sector was celebrated as key to the miraculous rejuvenation of an economy 
that only twenty years earlier had been dubbed the ‘sick man of Europe’. 
Inflation, rather than any thought of a meltdown, exercised the minds of 
macroeconomic policy experts in the months preceding the GFC. The 
preoccupation with inflation is apparent in a speech given by the Governor of 
the Bank of England in January 2007, just a few months before the collapse of 
Northern Rock which precipitated the first run on a UK bank in 150 years. 
Flattering his audience of Birmingham businessmen, the Governor proclaimed 
that ‘It is indeed much harder to run a business than to run a central bank’ – 
an ostensibly self-effacing claim that, ironically, was soon to be severely 
tested. The Governor then stressed that: 
<QM> 
it is our duty is to ensure that you do not experience the 
macroeconomic instabilities of the past and that we keep inflation on 
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track to meet our 2% target. Stability is in your interest just as much as 
mine. 
(King, 2007, emphasis added) 
 
The policy of maintaining a low rate of inflation, combined with a 
comparatively low cost of credit, resonated with an expectation of continuing 
growth undisturbed by ‘macroeconomic instabilities’. There could be few 
clearer indications of how, amongst the guardians of financial institutions and 
markets, embodied in the figurehead of the Governor, the possibility of 
systemic risk and meltdown had seemingly been erased, or at least displaced, 
from their collective memory. It was, apparently, taken for granted that neo-
liberal, market-centric policies and their associated, self-regulating practices 
would continue to deliver a combination of low inflation and steady growth 
that, in the words of UK Chancellor Gordon Brown, would result in ‘no return 
to boom and bust’. 
Confidence that stability was assured so long as inflation was 
controlled encouraged ever-higher levels of gearing (debt-to-equity ratio) – not 
only by corporations, and especially the investment banks, but also by 
consumers of financial products – such as households that take on mortgages 
and other forms of credit (e.g. loans for car purchase). Ballooning debt fuelled 
the rapidly expanding financial sector where its institutions competed to 
survive and grow by making highly leveraged acquisitions, the most 
spectacular of which was that of ABN Ambro by RBS and its minor partners 
Fortis and Banco Santander (Martin, 2013). The examples of RBS, but also 
AIG which is considered in some detail in a later section, are illustrative of 
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how, in the UK and the US, an unshakeable belief in continuing growth and 
financial stability followed from a subscription to the logic of neo-liberal 
economic policy. 
 Prior to 2008, there was, as the opening quotation from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicates, a massive expansion in the 
development and use of financial instruments (notably, derivatives) facilitated 
by what the IMF terms ‘the dispersion of credit risk’. Notably, there was an 
explosion of mortgage-backed securities (a form of CDO) as home loans were 
made more accessible to ‘sub-prime’ applicants, and applications were 
accepted which previously had been declined or redlined. Penetrating the 
home loans market more deeply, by making mortgages easier to obtain and 
cheaper to service through the alchemy of securitization, massively swelled 
both the revenues of the financial institutions and boosted the bonuses of 
traders dealing in those securities. Securitization was at the epicentre of a 
‘loads of money’2 Zeitgeist in which ‘maxing out’ credit/accumulating debt 
became an imperative for consumers and corporations alike. For 
corporations, the substitution of debt for equity capital, tacitly underwritten by 
an apparently remorseless rise in asset values (e.g. property), offered an 
irresistible means of increasing dividends and capital growth. For consumers, 
equity release and/or juggling credit cards presented an effortless way of 
compensating for a squeeze on wages and related benefits. As an article 
published in Harpers Magazine in May 2006, two years before the financial 
meltdown, presciently observed in relation to the aspirational as well as the 
avaricious appeal of mortgage borrowing: 
<QM> 
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the biggest incentive to home ownership has not been owning a home 
per se but rather the eternal hope of getting ahead. If the price of a 
$200,000 house shoots up 15 percent in a given year, the owner will 
realize a $30,000 capital gain. 
(Hudson, 2006, p. 41) 
 
As the article goes on to note, referring directly to the guru of modern 
macroeconomic policy, Alan Greenspan, the home equity loan bubble made a 
substantial contribution to the US economy: 
<QM> 
In a study last year [2005], Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy found 
that new home-equity loans added $200 billion to the U.S. economy in 
2004 alone… 
(ibid., p. 41) 
 
During the years preceding the global financial crisis (GFC), private 
indebtedness supplemented, and progressively replaced, public borrowing as 
a significant generator of economic activity. Consumers but also executives, 
who failed, or declined, to avail themselves of cheap credit by leveraging their 
equity in order to invest in property (or go on acquisition sprees) were 
evidently financial dunces: they were ‘missing a trick’ and risked ‘being left 
behind’. Those in possession of a modicum of nous eagerly, or from material 
necessity, plunged their/our snouts deeper into the credit trough as, obviously 
enough, asset prices were ever-rising. For homeowners, equity could be 
released or debts increased on the basis of paper capital gains. With regard 
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to US-based investment banks, their leverage had, until 2003, been limited by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 12 times capital. In 2004, 
it was raised to 40 times capital and compliance was made voluntary. In 
effect, the determination of the appropriate (prudent) ratio became a matter of 
internal corporate governance. Bonuses would be correspondingly boosted by 
raising these ratios to their upper limits. Unsurprisingly, in the absence of 
external regulation, asset-to-equity ratios in investment banks reached the 
upper 30s prior to the crisis. It was these ratios that resulted in the force and 
acceleration of the deleveraging dynamic that, in 2008, was precipitated by 
the crash in asset prices. 
It transpired that the apparently relentless rise in asset prices 
depended upon a strong faith in the governance of the lenders about how the 
loans were financed, and how the pricing of risks attached to them were 
calculated (and hedged) using seemingly sophisticated models and opaque 
financial instruments, such as CDOs and CDSs. This faith turned out to be 
myopic – and possibly wilfully so – at least in the case of traders employed by 
the biggest of the financial institutions. They had not failed to notice that the 
rewards (e.g. performance related bonuses) were immediate and tangible, 
while sanctions were non-existent or distant and hypothetical. For others, as 
the Harpers Magazine article cited above anticipated, the ‘real estate boom 
that began with the promise of “economic freedom” almost certainly will end 
with a growing number of workers locked in to a lifetime of debt service that 
absorbs every spare penny’ (Hudson, 2006, p. 41). 
When it appeared, two years before the meltdown, this assessment 
directly challenged the views of experts who advised that by raising interest 
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rates to slow down activity in the housing market, the very worst that could 
happen would be a familiar and temporary bear market followed by a shallow 
and short recession seven years after the meltdown. With the benefit of 
hindsight, the horrific scenario of workers locked into a lifetime of debt service 
sketched in the Harpers article seems almost benign. Today (June 2015), 
there is a scarier scenario of extended ‘debt serfdom’ in many economies. 
This scenario does not presume that there will be a slow recovery involving a 
comparatively familiar experience of living standards rising less rapidly for a 
brief period following a normal, temporary slump. Instead, its dystopian vision 
foresees continuing ‘debt serfdom’. In the UK context, the debt burden placed 
upon young people seeking a University education is illustrative of how such 
‘serfdom’ is experienced. But the bigger picture is of wealth redistribution and 
the corrosion of savings through depressed interest rates and the use of 
quantitative easing. Sluggish growth, stagnant wages, deterioration in the 
terms and conditions of employment and deep cuts in public services are 
forecast as the price to be paid by the next generation. The foreseeable future 
is one of striving to deal simultaneously with huge, post-GFC social 
dislocations while seeking to reduce the massive debts piled up as a 
consequence of the taxpayer bailout of a financial sector modelled upon a 
shareholder-value conception of corporate governance. Because the US and 
especially the UK economies are so dependent upon the financial sector, the 
sector remains largely unreconstructed (e.g. with regard to scale, ownership 
and ethos). And, moreover, the sector has become entombed in an 
increasingly baroque regulatory structure. While some areas of the financial 
sector are vibrant, others are unstable and probably unviable. Not only are 
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they vulnerable to future meltdown but insofar as they reproduce and increase 
inequalities of wealth, power and opportunity, they further undermine an 
already precarious social cohesion. 
 
<A>Anatomy of the Global Financial Crisis 
 
<B>Securitization 
 
It is instructive to situate the global financial crisis in the context of the 
preceding, exceptionally long, debt-fuelled economic boom marked by rising 
asset values, especially in property, that lasted, with a few minor interruptions 
and corrections, from the early 1990s.3 The boom in house purchase and the 
refinancing of mortgages provided a steady flow of payments that could be 
securitized in the financial markets of New York and London as CDOs (see 
Box 4.1). The attraction of securitization was that it: 
<QM> 
enabled much higher volumes of lending than would have been 
possible if banks had been able to lend only the sums their customers 
had deposited: by the time of the credit crisis, securitization funded 
more than half of all home mortgage lending in the US and a quarter of 
other consumer credit (Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association 2008, exhibit 17, p. 37). 
(MacKenzie, 2009a, p. 25, emphasis added) 
<BOX> 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 12 
<BOXH>Box 4.1 Securitization: CDOs and CDSs in the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis 
In principle, securitization, which includes the creation of CDOs, creates a secondary market for loans, 
such as home mortgages: it attracts capital in order to provide additional loans for conversion into 
securities and, by improving market efficiency, decreases their cost. CDOs graded by the rating 
agencies as investment grade (lowest risk), offered significantly better returns than gilts or corporate and 
government bonds. This competitive advantage resulted in their rapid and sustained growth and 
escalating complexity. Securitization has enabled financial institutions around the world to invest in, and 
thereby `democratize credit’. It is these features and functions that the advocates of securitization, 
notably Alan Greenspan (Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, 1987‒2006), prior to his epiphany, 
stridently celebrate. 
 
For lenders, securitization provides the means of instantly realizing the value of any cash-producing 
asset. The payment stream is, in effect, received as a lump sum which can then be used to provide 
further loans, ad infinitum. The chief attraction of mortgage-based CDOs to insurance companies as well 
as pension funds and banks is their ability to offer a substantially better (up to 2‒3 per cent) return than 
corporate bonds with an equivalent credit rating. Even when the rate of return was comparatively low, as 
in the case of the least risky, senior and super-senior tranches, banks bought the CDOs in volume as 
they could make a slender spread by borrowing at the marginally cheaper Libor rate (the rate at which 
banks borrow unsecured funds from other banks). The originators of CDOs often retain the very safest 
tranches because, although they offer the least attractive returns, they can be insured comparatively 
cheaply. 
 
There is, however, another, often conveniently overlooked or downplayed, feature of securitization. The 
securitization and re-securitization of the loans is undertaken by investment banks in conjunction, or in 
cahoots,4 with the credit rating agencies. Like the auditors of the financial institutions, the rating 
agencies have every reason not to ask challenging questions, even if they are supposed to possess the 
expertise required to ask them. Using historical data, the agencies did not contemplate or incorporate 
into their modelling the risk of a more systemic crisis, as contrasted with a temporary correction 
(Feirstein, 2009). The chance that defaults would cluster – referred to as the `correlation rate’ – was 
calculated by the rating agencies as 0.3.5 All parties had every incentive to trust in the expertise of the 
agencies or suspend any doubts that they may have had in the credibility of their ratings. In any event, 
the traders who earned very tidy bonuses from selling the CDOs had no responsibility for the risks 
passed on to their purchasers. 
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Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) are privately negotiated contracts which offer an insurance against 
defaulting CDOs. They provide a low-cost hedge but they may also be bought speculatively in 
anticipation that a CDO will default. In 2003, they had a global value of around US$ 3 trillion which grew 
to US$45 trillion by 2007. Insurance companies, such as the giant AIG, provided the CDSs for clients 
wishing to hedge against defaults, or exceptionally to those who anticipated that certain CDOs would 
default. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Responsibility for assessing the risks of CDOs is the bread-and-butter 
business of the rating agencies. Paid by packagers of CDOs – the investment 
banks – the rating agencies compete for this lucrative business for which they 
are richly rewarded. During the years preceding the financial crisis, the 
models used by the agencies did not factor in the chance that the mezzanine 
and even senior tranches of the CDOs (see Appendix A) to which they 
assigned an investment grade rating might sink to speculative (or ‘junk’) 
status. The logic of the exclusion of this risk from their calculations was that it 
had never happened before. That undeniable fact was not, however, 
counterbalanced by the inconvenient fact that packaging sub-prime 
mortgages on an industrial scale was also wholly unprecedented. Nor was 
any consideration given to how sight could be quickly lost of where the risk 
was held. Supporters of extensive securitization emphasise the virtue of its 
de-concentration of risk which contributes to reducing and thereby 
democratizes credit (see Appendix B). Its often wise-after-the-event critics, in 
contrast, have pointed to its obfuscation of risk and vulnerability to systemic 
contamination.6 
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<B>Home Loans, CDOs and CDSs 
 
The massive expansion of credit associated with low interest rates was 
eventually curtailed by a series of US rate increases (2004) (see Appendix C) 
that progressively flattened property values and resulted in a rising number of 
loan defaults. Initially, these were interpreted as an indicator of a normal and 
expected cooling down of a slightly overheated market. However, by the 
summer of 2006, domestic property prices in the US started to fall; and by the 
end of November, the index of subprime mortgage bonds (ABX) indicated that 
borrowers were failing to make payments sufficient to pay off the very riskiest 
tranches of mortgage-backed securities. Despite this, where securities had 
received an AAA (investment grade) rating, the prices of the CDOs remained 
stable. It was six months later, in early 2007, that some misgivings were aired 
about the possible implications of falling US housing values for mortgage-
backed CDOs. Yet, demand for the CDOs remained strong as a consequence 
of their delivery of comparatively high returns, and their ostensibly investment 
grade quality. Even as housing prices fell and foreclosures increased, few 
market players and commentators had sufficient cause to ask searching 
questions about the correspondence between the rating of CDOs and their 
contents. The profitability and associated bonuses delivered by the CDOs 
appeared to inhibit doubts about the solidity of AAA-rated CDOs and the 
prospect of them melting into air. Even when commentators presented explicit 
and detailed challenges to this assessment (e.g. Tomlinson and Evans, 
2007), their siren voices were unheeded, or were dismissed as alarmist. 
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Wherever securities became widely traded, there was a demand for 
hedges – that is, protection against the risks attaching to possible, even if 
highly unlikely, falls in their value. For holders of CDOs, and also for a few 
traders and institutions (e.g. hedge funds) making speculative bets against 
CDOs in anticipation of their possible default, the hedges took the form of 
CDSs (see Box 4.1). On the other side of these trades, the sellers of CDSs – 
notably, American International Group (AIG) – were eager to do business as 
their models predicted negligible risk of default. 
Regardless of whether staff in investment banks (e.g. Lehman Brothers 
and insurance companies such as AIG) were engaged in packaging together 
and selling CDOs, or seeking protection against CDO default, they had little 
reason to concern themselves with the reliability of the grading, or the 
dispersal and traceability, of the CDOs. For them, the more pressing, bonus-
rewarded challenge was to obtain sufficient volumes of loans (e.g. mortgages) 
to package into CDOs. In turn, this mass production of CDOs fuelled demand 
for CDSs from which seemingly riskless revenues and guaranteed bonuses 
could be earned. The supply of CDOs was addressed by devising and 
stimulating innovative ways, legal and illegal, to expand an untapped segment 
of the housing market: sub-prime. In the US, this opportunity had been 
opened up by an earlier change in US legislation, to be considered below, that 
was intended to correct a rather different problem: the indiscriminate redlining 
of mortgage applications originating from certain disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. 
 
<B>Risk, Meltdown and Bailout 
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The unexpected fall in property values that followed the rise in interest rates 
triggered a higher level of defaults than had been predicted by the risk 
models. Supposedly impregnable tranches of CDOs came under water. 
Those who had not purchased CDSs to hedge their positions struggled to sell 
their holdings. Falls in the value of CDOs were further accelerated by the use 
of mark-to-market accounting which tracked the highs and lows of market 
prices, irrespective of any reference to their book value or (presumed) 
underlying worth. Those who had hedged their positions called upon the 
issuers of CDSs, including AIG, to restore their collateral. Those calls induced 
panic selling. The markets froze as the solvency of all financial institutions 
was placed in doubt by the limited traceability of the toxic CDOs. 
In the months preceding the GFC, analysts and traders had been 
content to trust the ratings provided by the agencies. Only in exceptional 
cases did they undertake the painstaking detailed forensic task of establishing 
how sub-prime mortgages had been packaged and graded. The few traders 
who closely investigated the dubious provenance of many CDOs were able to 
purchase CDSs cheaply because the ratings agencies had assigned them an 
investment grade status. Their nerdish diligence paid off handsomely when 
the markets went into free fall (Zuckerman, 2009). Aside from the taxpayers 
who were assigned by political elites to pick up the very sizeable tab, the 
biggest losers were the employees, clients and shareholders of the 
counterparties, such as AIG, especially in cases where no hedge had been 
made against default, despite the low cost of doing so (ibid., p. 156). 
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As the markets crashed, it was no longer home owners who found 
themselves, or were suspected to be, in negative equity territory, and could 
obtain credit only at unattractively high rates. When it was impossible to 
determine which parties were left holding the toxic CDOs and/or remained 
solvent, inter-bank lending locked up as every financial institution hoarded 
whatever liquidity it had, or could acquire. The market for securities became 
increasingly unstable before completely drying up as collateral was demanded 
by counterparties, resulting in the balance sheets of heavily geared financial 
institutions being further weakened. Investment banks teetered at the edge of 
the void of insolvency, with Lehman Brothers, the most leveraged and least 
liquid of them, at the head of the line. 
That no other investment bank stepped in to acquire Lehman Brothers, 
even at a knock-down price, indicated the magnitude of its exposures, notably 
in the mortgage-backed CDO market. As other institutions – banks and IAG – 
lined up behind Lehmans’ to go to the wall, respect could, at this point, have 
been shown for the ‘laws’ of neoclassical economics. That is to say, their fate 
could have been left to the Market: those that had lived and prospered by its 
sword would be cut down by it. Failing, lame duck institutions would have 
been allowed to collapse, thereby, in principle, celebrating and restoring 
Market discipline and efficiency. Instead, and in defiance of the Market 
mantra, intervention by the US government averted the prospect of a 
repetition of Lehman’s fate across the financial sector, and variants of this 
bail-out scenario were repeated in the UK and elsewhere. Deemed to be ‘too 
big to fail’ (Sorking, 2009), numerous investment banks and also AIG were 
saved through a huge injection of public funds that minimally restored their 
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balance sheets. Either their toxic assets were bought up (the US approach) or 
the failing banks were placed in ‘temporary’ public ownership by holding 
preference shares and offering loan guarantees (the UK approach). 
Lehman’s collapse and its immediate aftermath pointed unmistakably 
to the existence of a toxic barrel of mutually contaminated rotten apples 
whose immanent insolvency threatened a cataclysmic global meltdown of 
global capitalism. As will be shown shortly, AIG was one of the largest and 
rottenest of these apples, and it received the largest bail-out. It had sold huge 
volumes of CDSs without either investigating or hedging against the risk of 
CDOs proving to be inadequately graded or becoming toxic. Only a massive 
injection of liquidity forestalled the demise of the zombie financial firms, 
thereby saving the financial sector from the forces of destruction that it had 
unleashed upon itself. 
 
 
<A>Home Ownership and Normalizing Subprime: A Political Economy of 
Mortgages 
The economies of the UK and US are, as noted earlier, exceptional in the 
importance placed upon home ownership. It is reflected in the scale of the 
loans serviced by purchasers of domestic property that dwarfs other forms of 
personal borrowing (e.g. credit cards, overdrafts and finance for other assets, 
such as cars and white goods). Any fall, or even flat-lining, of property values 
is significant politically as well as economically as voters are generally more 
supportive of the party in power when the value of their assets, including their 
homes, is rising. It is this political sensitivity that leads governments to make 
 19 
interventions in the housing market that are intended to affirm, secure and/or 
enhance those values – for example, by opening up the market to new 
providers; by enabling access to capital markets for existing providers through 
demutualization (see Klimecki and Willmott, 2009). Such responsiveness 
extend to making legislative changes whose purpose is to improve the 
availability and affordability of loans to those previously unable to access 
them. 
Such interventions are consistent with neo-liberal policy where the role 
of the state is to champion markets by enabling their more effective, 
unimpeded operation. The state may, for example, intervene to create 
conditions in which financial institutions are incentivized to demonstrate 
greater ‘commitment to serving borrowers who may not meet traditional 
underwriting standards’ (Schwartz, 2012, p. 332 citing Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston, 1993). In the UK, ‘Big Bang’ incentivised building societies to 
demutualize and it enabled banks to penetrate, and thereby shake up, a 
mortgage market previously dominated by mutuals (Klimecki and Willmott, 
2009). The outcome was intensified competition in which the big proprietary 
banks, many of which were later to be bailed out by taxpayers, were the 
winners. They gained market share from the mutuals while comparatively 
small and undiversified demutualized societies struggled to deliver the capital 
growth demanded by its shareholders. Northern Rock, for example, pursued a 
strategy of heavy reliance upon the wholesale markets. When these markets 
dried up, the resulting evaporation of liquidity contributed to its collapse which 
was followed by other demutualized building societies none of which survived 
the financial crisis. 
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Turning to the US, whose economy makes it much more significant 
globally, the most significant state intervention in the housing market can be 
traced to a well-intentioned but ill-fated move by the Carter administration. In 
1977, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was introduced to tackle the 
issue of discriminatory ‘redlining’ of entire (disadvantaged) neighbourhoods. 
Redlining made it either impossible to obtain a mortgage by lower income 
groups, or made obtaining such loans conditional upon making substantively 
higher down payments and/or accepting shorter repayment periods.7 With the 
objective of making home loans more widely available, the CRA gave the 
banks some comparatively gentle ‘encouragement’ to lend to (potentially 
riskier) borrowers from neighbourhoods that had previously been 
indiscriminately redlined. This ‘encouragement’ involved sanctioning lenders 
who showed a reluctance to issue such loans – for example, by blocking 
lenders’ expansionist ambitions by providing unfavourable evaluations of their 
applications for new branches and mergers. 
A subsequent and seemingly innocuous tweak to the 1977 CRA made 
in 1995 by the Clinton administration had the (unintended) consequence of 
normalizing as well as expanding, but never entirely legitimizing, the riskiest 
segment of the mortgage market. The tweak involved a substantial tightening 
of the supervision of banks which became subject to more exacting 
compliance measures. An unanticipated outcome was an expansion of sub-
prime lending by ‘predatory lenders’. Crucially, the Clinton tweak also 
incorporated an invitation to community groups to complain when lenders 
were making loans below the amount calculated for each neighbourhood 
based on federal home-loan data. Community groups collected a fee from the 
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lenders for marketing loans to target groups (Husock, 2000). In 2000, the 
Senate Banking Committee estimated that, in just three years, community 
groups had received $9.5 billion in services and salaries – which is an 
instructive indicator of the rate of expansion into the subprime segment of the 
mortgate market. So, a perverse effect of the Clinton tweak was greatly to 
increase, rather than to remove, the number and levels of activity of the 
shadowy businesses (‘predatory lenders’) that traditionally serviced the 
subprime market; and thereby to create a boom in this market segment. 
Less shadowy lenders were willing to comply with CRA criteria 
because, following the introduction of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Branching 
and Efficiency Act (1994), passing a CRA review process was, as noted 
above, important when lenders wished to expand (e.g. through merger and 
acquisition). In 1999, the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act repealed parts of the 
Glass–Steagall Act. This allowed local banks to offer a full range of 
investment services – a change explicitly welcomed by the Clinton 
administrtation as a way of expanding the reach of the CRA. As a 
consequence of these changes in legislation, growth in the sub-prime sector 
was rapid, propelled as it was by the simultaneous development of 
‘innovative’ products – that is, ‘interest only’ but, more importantly, ‘adjustable 
rate’ mortgages – and payment methods tailored to lower income borrowers, 
including those with a patchy employment history. 
The Clinton tweak to the CRA enabled many more loans to be made 
available to, and affordable by, lower and irregular income borrowers. It also 
legitimized and normalized this practice of lending to customers who 
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previously had no prospect whatsoever of obtaining a home loan. By the early 
2000s, the sub-prime segment was the most rapidly expanding part of the 
mortgage market; and this market was increasingly being serviced by 
shadowy, non-CRA lenders (e.g. independent mortgage companies such as 
Ameriquest and New Century Financial) as well as affiliates of banks or thrifts 
that were not subject to routine supervision or examination (Gordon, 2008). 
The numbers are dizzying. Between 1994 and 2003, sub-prime mortgage 
loans increased by 25 per cent every year – that is, a ten-fold increase in nine 
years. Between 1997 and 2006, the price of the typical American house 
increased by 124 per cent. Brokers sold, or pushed, loans to almost anyone 
who could be persuaded to borrow, regardless of their immediate or projected 
ability to meet the monthly payments, should interest rates rise. When US 
interest rates began to rise by 2004, there was an initial flatenning of property 
values that was soon to become a fall. By the third quarter of 2007, sub-prime 
adjustable rate mortgages in the US comprised about 7 per cent of those in 
arrears; and these accounted for nearly 50 per cent of the foreclosures which 
began during that quarter. This was roughly triple the rate of arrears and 
foreclosures in 2005. By January 2008, the equivalent rate of arrears had 
risen to 21 per cent, and by May 2008 it was 25 per cent. By August 2008, 
over 9 per cent of all US mortgages outstanding were either in arrears or in 
foreclosure. 
The home loans had been arranged easily not only because interest 
rates prior to 2004 had been held low but also because investment banks 
were ready and eager to securitize the loans. It was the contents and rating of 
the CDOs that made those mortgages readily available. The ahistorical 
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modelling of risk by the agencies combined with the self-serving reliance of 
financial firms upon their ratings, meant that it was not just the high risk, 
‘junior’ tranches that were affected by defaults; it was also some of the other, 
ostensibly investment grade tranches. The securitization of sub-prime 
mortgages acted to accelerate the speed and depth of the financial meltdown 
as the value of CDOs plunged. As will be shown in a later section, the 
collapse is also attributable to the recklessness of counterparties, notably 
AIG, who were eager to provide a hedge, in the form of CDSs, against the risk 
of CDOs defaulting, without themselves hedging the risk of this business. The 
question of why a company like AIG was able to take this business without 
itself adopting measures to hedge against its risk is considered in the 
following section. 
 
 
<A>Corporate Governance: The Case of AIG 
 
‘Corporate governance’, Blair (1995) argues, extends to ‘the whole set of 
legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly 
traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised 
and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated’ 
(ibid., p. 3). In the analysis of AIG, the focus is principally upon the ‘control 
exercised’, and the allocation of risks and returns. Whether the ‘set’ of legal, 
cultural and institutional ‘arrangements’ actually ‘determine(s)’ what 
corporations ‘can do’, rather than condition actions that are taken by corporate 
actors, is debatable. Nonetheless, Blair’s inclusive conception of corporate 
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governance is broadly endorsed here, and it should be born in mind when 
considering the case of AIG. The following analysis does address the exercise 
of control and risk/reward allocations but it does so in relation what Blair 
plausibly characterizes as a comparatively narrow sense of corporate 
governance: one limited to operations within companies that include, for 
example, ‘questions about the structure and functioning of boards of directors 
and the rights and prerogatives of shareholders in boardroom decision 
making’ (ibid.). That said, Blair’s broader vision of corporate governance 
explicitly includes ‘aspects of corporate finance, securities law [and] laws 
governing the behaviour of financial institutions’ as well as ‘internal 
information and control systems’ (ibid., pp. 3‒4) – all of which are pertinent to 
the AIG case. 
 
<B>Strategic Risk Management 
 
Led by the highly capable but autocratic Hank Greenberg, AIG expanded 
rapidly from the early 1970s when it comprised a modest collection of 
insurance businesses that had been created during the previous fifty years. 
The dramatic and unexpected collapse of AIG in 2008, which had been a 
highly regarded global player, begs questions about the responsibilities of its 
directors in monitoring and interrogating the source and exposures of its major 
revenue streams, notably the activities of AIGFP. In 1994, AIGFP generated a 
modest income of around $100m. In 2005, this ballooned to $2.7bn, 
amounting to 25 per cent of AIG’s net income. It was this operation within AIG 
that was entirely responsible for bankrupting the company. It casts doubt upon 
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a model and structure of corporate governance at AIG that in very many 
respects was formally compliant with ‘best practice’, yet it failed spectacularly 
to challenge and forestall engagement in excessive, unhedged risk-taking. 
Through a strategy of diversification as well as expansion of its 
established insurance business,8 AIG under Greenberg’s leadership had 
achieved consistently stellar returns of around 15 per cent that compared to 
an industry norm of around half that. All AIG executives were ‘asked to attain 
three targets: 15% annual revenue growth, 15% profit increases per year, and 
15% return of equity increases annually’ (Shelp and Ehrbar, 2009; Pathak et 
al., 2013, p. 358). As a consequence of its outstanding financial performance, 
the company and its tireless CEO enjoyed an unparalleled reputation in the 
industry. AIG benefited considerably from a seemingly rock solid AAA credit 
rating that reduced the cost of the company’s borrowing, thereby making it 
possible to undercut much of the competition and attract customers from 
whom concessions in price and risk could be ‘negotiated’. Of particular 
relevance for the present analysis, the AAA rating enabled AIGFP to compete 
effectively against investment banks in the long-term swaps market. 
In late 1993, the AIG stock price reached $88 as investors regarded 
AIG as a safe-as-houses insurance company that, unlike the banks, was not 
operating in comparatively riskier markets.9 In 1996, AIG hired Charles M. 
Lucas from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York where he had directed its 
risk assessment and control systems. Lucas served as AIG’s director of 
market risk management who oversaw the creation of a ‘state-of-the-art risk 
enterprise system that addressed both credit risk and market risk’ (Greenberg 
and Cunningham, 2013, p. 147; see also pp. 148, 229). Supported by this 
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system, ‘FP [Financial Product] managers, other independent AIG units, the 
company’s outside auditors as well as the board of directors consistently 
monitored FP’s risk portfolio’ (ibid.), at least up until the time of the forced 
departure of its CEO from AIG in 2005. 
In 1998, AIG had cautiously entered the CDS business when it 
accepted $194m from J.P. Morgan to insure the credit risk on $9.7bn AAA 
rated CDOs (see Boyd, 2011, p. 87 et seq; Tett, 2010, pp. 71‒3). For AIG, 
this revenue seemed to be virtually risk-free revenue as, following painstaking 
analysis, the chances of the AAA defaulting was shown to be infinitesimal 
(see Boyd, 2011, pp. 88‒9). For J.P. Morgan, the deal released cash to make 
further investments (e.g. in CDOs) that would otherwise have been held in 
reserve in case of default. 
 
<B>‘Money for Nothing’, Reputational Damage and the AIG Indulgency 
Pattern 
 
In post-mortems on AIG, considerable attention has been paid to the activities 
of AIGFP. Much less attention has been directed to how governance at AIG 
was entwined with its strategy for delivering its targets of 15 per cent annual 
revenue growth, 15 per cent profit increases per year, and 15 per cent return 
on equity. A sea change occurred at AIGFP when in 2001, two years after the 
repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act, its head, Tom Savage, was replaced his 
deputy, by Joe Cassano. It has been widely reported that Cassano greatly 
appreciated the bonuses that flowed from the CDS business: he earned more 
than US$280m in cash during his final eight years (2000‒08). While eager to 
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maximise his compensation,10 Cassano was less inclined to insist upon 
undertaking the highly detailed, stress-testing, analysis demanded by his 
predecessor. Of more importance, the bonus system at AIG incentivized 
engagement in trades, but not the closeness of attention paid to the analysis 
of their risks. 
For AIG, the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act in 1999 was significant 
because it drew commercial banks, with their huge customer deposits, into 
the world of investment banking, to which the investment banks responded by 
borrowing huge amounts – between 30 and 40 times their equity capital by 
2005‒08. Much of this debt, borrowed cheaply when interest rates were held 
low, was used to purchase longer term, higher yield assets – notably, 
mortgages to be packaged as CDOs. When firms acted prudently, the CDOs 
were hedged by purchasing CDSs from companies such as AIG. For the AIG 
trades appeared to delivery ‘money for nothing’: Rajan (2010) reports that 
`Privately, AIGFP executives said the swaps contracts (CDSs) were like 
selling insurance for catastrophes that would never happen; they brought in 
money for nothing’ (ibid., p. 135). 
Until the late 1990s, Greenberg’s 15/15/15 metric had been achieved 
through an expansion strategy of acquiring companies with profit potential. As 
the potential acquisition targets reduced in number and appeal, the strategy 
yielded diminishing returns. It was also difficult to expand the existing CDS 
business that was based upon providing capital relief (see above). So, the 
pressure was on to identify other revenue streams. These pressures 
coincided with the company’s involvement in a number of dubious deals, the 
most damaging of which was made with Gen Re in 2000, and which came to 
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light five years later as a consequence of an SEC investigation of another 
insurer (Boyd, 2011). There are conflicting accounts of how this reputationally 
damaging deal occurred, with Greenberg insisting that his instruction had 
been misunderstood or miscommunicated (Greenberg and Cunningham, 
2013).11 Following the Gen Re scandal and some other damaging events (see 
note 9 for details), AIG’s safe-as-houses reputation was placed in some 
doubt. Questions began to be asked about whether even the legendary 
Greenberg could ‘control the far-flung businesses…the way that he once 
had…Where he was demonstrably losing his grasp was in the quest to bolster 
earnings via the use of ethically marginal financing techniques’ (Boyd 2011, p. 
117‒18). 
In the wake of the revelations about Gen Re and other lesser dents to 
AIG’s reputation, it is remarkable that no AIG employee was reassigned within 
the company, let alone fired. It is probable that this forgiving, or indulgent, 
attitude sent a signal to all AIG staff, including Joe Cassano, the head of 
AIGFP. It conveyed, or invited, the understanding that questionable, and 
perhaps even illegal, dealings were viewed by senior executives, notably 
Greenberg, as minor infringements that were almost unavoidable in a 
company as dynamic, dispersed and complex as AIG. If that were so, then it 
said as much about the acceptability, and perhaps unavoidability, of sailing 
dangerously close to the wind by making potentially damaging deals in order 
to deliver the 15/15/15 targets as it did about senior executives’ commitment 
to AIG staff. 
AIG’s dubious deals attracted the attentions of a politically ambitious 
New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer. In the aftermath of Enron (Willmott, 
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2011), Spitzer sought to make his reputation by ‘cleaning up’ AIG. That, for 
him, meant claiming the scalp of Greenberg, a headline grabbing result that 
could only boost his populist appeal. Faced with a vocal and aggressive 
Attorney General, the AIG board, supported by the company’s auditor, PwC, 
were disinclined to provoke the closer attentions of Spitzer. They fired 
Greenberg (in 2005) in order to avoid Spitzer’s threatened indictment of AIG 
over deals that, as Greenberg was keen to point out, amounted altogether to 
less than 1 per cent of its book value. As a consequence of the bad publicity 
associated with those deals, and compounded by Greenberg’s outraged and 
noisy departure, AIG’S treasured AAA rating was marked down to AA+. This 
triggered a series of collateral calls on the company amounting to $1.2bn, and 
turned out to be the beginning of the end of AIG. 
 
<B>Bounty Hunt and Nemesis 
 
The rapid and dramatic change in the reputation and fortunes of AIG, 
reflected in pressures on its stock price, prompted Greenberg’s successor, 
Martin Sullivan, to urge his staff to renew their search for other sources of 
good earnings. Sullivan’s call was answered by a massive expansion of the 
CDS business, most of which, it later became apparent, was not hedged 
against the potential risks of it being called in. As Sjostrum (2009) comments, 
AIG was content to pocket the premiums, seemingly certain that the CDSs 
would expire untriggered. In the years running up to the GFC, sellers of 
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CDSs, most notably AIG, were eager to take on vast liabilities as they seemed 
to be purely theoretical. In the event of loans defaulting, it was assumed that 
the investment grade CDOs covered by the CDSs would remain well above 
water: they would be the very last to default as the lower rated tranches would 
comfortably absorb any losses. Despite the reduction of the AAA rating to AA 
+ AIG continued to enjoy a very high credit rating. As AIG was judged by the 
ratings agencies to be comfortably capable of covering any losses, its 
counterparties remained willing to pay a premium for protection against the 
remote possibility of investment grade CDOs defaulting. 
The amounts involved were huge. According to Lewis (2010, p. 71), 
during 2005, ‘[i]n a matter of months, AIGFP, in effect, bought $50bn in triple-
B-rated sub-prime mortgage bonds by insuring them against default’ (see also 
Greenberg and Cunningham, 2013, pp. 231‒2). And yet, as Lewis goes on to 
observe: 
<QM> 
no one said anything about issuing these CDSs – not AIG CEO Martin 
Sullivan, not the head of AIGFP Joe Cassano, not the guy in AIGFPs 
Connecticut office in charge of selling his firm’s credit default swaps to 
the big Wall Street firms…The deals by all accounts, were simply 
rubber-stamped – stamped inside AIG, and then again by AIG brass. 
(Lewis, 2010, p. 71) 
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Moreover, many of the CDSs written by AIG incorporated credit support 
annexes (CSAs). These mandated that the CDS is marked to the market price 
of the CDO on a nightly basis. In what was, according to the risk models, the 
highly unlikely event of the market price of a CDO dropping by four 
percentage points or more, AIG would become liable to the counterparty for 
the equivalent sum. 
In just six months, from December 2004 to mid-2005, AIGFP’s CDS 
portfolio of $17.9bn had increased three-fold to $54.3bn. It was eventually 
shut down in the autumn of 2005 when there was about $73bn exposure to 
CDOs, many of them containing mortgages issued to economically marginal 
borrowers. This amounted to 75 per cent of AIG’s equity base. Yet, apart from 
Joe Cassano and his immediate colleagues no one at AIG, not even the chief 
risk officer, knew about the CSAs or thought to investigate the provenance of 
the CDOs despite, or maybe because of, their massive contribution to AIG’s 
income. Subsequent investigations of AIG did not identify ‘a single instance of 
a senior manager sending so much as an inquisitive email about the swaps 
portfolio, despite it accounting for 75 per cent of AIG’s equity base’ (Boyd, 
2011, p. 207). Nor is there any evidence of board members raising questions 
about what was a crucially important, rapidly growing source of AIG’s 
revenues, its declared profits and its executives’ balooning bonuses. It 
seemed that the company’s outstanding results in 2006 – it generated $113bn 
in revenues with profit margins of 19.1 per cent pre-tax – effectively silenced, 
or at least impeded, any potentially unsettling curiosity about the nature of the 
goose laying AIGs golden eggs, and so strongly disincentivized any potential 
inclination to raise challenging questions or engaged in difficult conversations. 
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In other words, corporate governance considerations were eclipsed so long as 
AIG was delivering bottom line results, and as long as members of the board, 
or the risk management committees, declined to voice any concerns about 
how these outstanding results were produced or what risks were attached to 
them. 
In the summer of 2007, almost a year after borrower delinquencies 
were widely known to be growing, the ratings agencies finally began to 
downgrade residential mortgage-backed securities. The securities then traded 
well below par, resulting in collateral calls upon AIG where the CDSs carried a 
credit support annexe (CSA, see above) – notably, by Goldman Sachs who 
had been hedging their exposure to CDOs. As AIG responded to these calls, 
the company became progressively drained of liquidity. Even so, when the 
AIG compensation committee met in March 2008 to review the bonus 
allocation, CEO Martin Sullivan successfully lobbied the committee to exclude 
the losses when calculating the bonus pool. Again, it is relevant to ask: where 
was the corporate governance? Removing the losses from their calculations, 
produced an overstated bonus of US$5.6m for the CEO and corresponding 
overstatements for other executives. 
Robert Willumstad, who had been chairman of the AIG board since 
November 2006, succeeded Martin Sullivan to became CEO in June 2008. He 
is reported to have remarked that if no one on the AIG board had been told 
that so much CDS business had been written, its scale and exposure should 
at least have prompted some consideration in risk management (Boyd, 2011, 
p. 245), thereby passing the buck from the board to an internal function. Here 
it may be asked: why were board members not actively asking this major 
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source of revenue rather than expecting to be informed about it? Greater 
vigilance from internal functions might have been reasonably expected but 
only if it is actively encouraged, or even demanded, by senior executives who, 
it appeared, were content to be wilfully blind to the activities of AIGFP, or were 
grossly incompetent with regard to their fiduciary duties. Where was the 
corporate governance: why didn’t members of the AIG board, which 
Willumstad chaired from late 2006 to June 2008, actively demand more 
information about where and AIG’s performance and profits were being 
generated, especially when the answer to this question pointed directly to the 
very rapidly expanding and known-to-be-risky area of AIG’s activity? It was 
only after the event – when AIG was clearly in trouble in November 2007 – 
that its auditor eventually raised concerns about the source of AIGs revenues. 
In a report delivered to the board in early December, PwC emerged from a 
deep, seemingly self-induced sleep to declare that the amount of collateral 
being called in on its CDSs might constitute a ‘control deficiency’ which was a 
violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Further investigation led PwC to file an 8-
K statement that referred to a ‘material weakness’ with regard to the ‘fair 
valuation of the AIGFP super-senior credit-default swap portfolio’ (see 
Greenberg and Cunningham, 2013, p. 235 et seq). PwC’s late but stinging 
intervention begs the question of how, and why, the auditor had failed to 
identify and/or register the risks associated with the ballooning of the CDS 
business much earlier. Only when there was a clear threat to the reputation of 
PwC, it seems, did the auditor sound the alarm. 
The multiple failures of corporate governance occurred, Boyd (2011) 
suggests, because ‘AIG worked where it mattered: the earnings release’ 
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(ibid., p. 177). Members of the board contrived to ignore the Elephant in the 
room because, as one supervisor put it, ‘No one said anything at the board 
level because AIG worked where it mattered: the earnings release… “We 
knew it was crazy, but our job wasn’t to worry about that; it was to ensure that 
good numbers came out”’ (ibid.). When the 8-K statement demanded by PwC 
was released, it resulted in a $11.47bn write-down that reduced AIG’s 
earnings to $6bn from $14bn. This led to AIG stock dropping a further 11 per 
cent in addition to the previous month’s fall of 14 per cent. In May 2008, AIG 
suffered yet another $9.1bn charge on its swaps book and announced a 
$7.81bn loss. The company simply could not keep up with demands for 
collateral because it could not sell its assets quickly enough to restore its 
liquidity. It then faced bankruptcy or bail out. 
 
 
<A>Reflection 
 
Before AIG collapsed, the Federal Reserve stepped in with an initial huge 
taxpayer loan of $85bn that allowed the company to meet its immediate 
obligations to clients. The loan lubricated AIG’s global insurance business as 
it provided $500bn of credit protection to its corporate clients. It also averted 
the threat of chaos and dislocation in equity and bond markets, with potential 
knock-on effects in product markets as well as annuities on a scale that that 
would have dwarfed the fall-out from the failure of Lehman Brothers. As AIG 
was one of the ten most widely held stocks in 401(k) retirement plans, its 
collapse also risked a run on mutual funds. 
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The initial loan to AIG was subsequently supplemented by a further 
$100bn in exchange for 80 per cent equity ownership. The bail-outs which 
threw a lifeline to AIG and other zombie financial firms were provided without 
any quid pro quo in the form of a rejection of, or even any substantial change 
in, the ‘new growth model’ spawned by neo-liberal thinking. While the global 
financial system has been resuscitated by the bail outs and quantitative 
easing, the global economy remains, in 2015, plagued by counterproductive 
efforts to address structural instabilities that have spread from problems of 
corporate solvency to sovereign indebtedness. At the time of the bail-out and 
since, attention to the structural basis of instability – notably, the ‘too big’ 
concentration in the sector compounded by competitive, short-term pressures 
to deliver shareholder value and the retention of associated incentives to do 
so – has tended to become displaced. The focus has shifted to compensatory 
elaborations of the regulatory apparatus, some undemanding restructuring, 
and some rather vacuous calls to change the culture of the financial sector. 
With regard to AIG, it is notable that the Warren Report’s detailed examination 
of the company’s operation prior to the government rescue makes almost no 
reference to the role of AIG’s corporate governance (Congressional Oversight 
Panel, 2010, pp. 18‒57), preferring to focus instead upon the shortcomings of 
the regulatory regime, especially the role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, and the credit rating agencies. 
The limited attention directed at AIG’s corporate governance is 
lamentable precisely because, in formal terms, many of its features were 
exemplary. For example, its board membership comprised an overwhelming 
majority of outside, ostensibly independent directors - the ratio ranged from 
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not less than 10:6 (2003) to as many as 14:2 (2007). Direct reference is made 
by AIG to the ‘value of diversity of experience and views amongst Board 
members’ and the company proclaimed that its size ‘facilitate[s] substantive 
discussion by the whole board in which each director can participate 
meaningfully’ (cited by Vududev, 2009, p. 27). So, where were these 
independent experts during 2000‒07, and what ‘substantive’ was their well 
rewarded expertise initiating or illuminating? A detailed examination of AIG 
disclosures and statements on its credit deriviatives (CDS) business from 
2002 to 2007 highlights a number of issues that could, and arguably, should 
have been picked up and examined by AIG’s ostensibly high-powered board 
members (Vasudev, 2009). These include: the lack of explanation in the 2002 
filings of why the default swaps business was handled by AIGFP rather than 
the insurance arm of AIG, and also a Derivatives Review Committee that was 
not a committee of AIG directors and which did not examine the credit 
derivatives business at AIGFP as this was treated as an independent 
operation. 
How was it possible that members of the AIG board failed to question 
the basis for the claimed independence of AIGFP and the absence of any of 
its board members from the committee that reviewed its derivatives business? 
As early as 2002, AIG’s filing acknowledged that the company was exposed 
to the credit risk associated with CDSs sold by the AIGFP: ‘AIG guarantees 
AIGFP’s debt and, as a result, is responsible for all AIGFP’s obligations’ 
(Vasudev, 2009 citing AIG Form 10-K, p. 50) This statement noted an 
‘upside’, namely that AIG would be liable for payment only after default in the 
first 11 per cent of the portfolio; but absent from the statement was any 
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equivalent recognition of the possibility of simultaneous defaults in different 
tranches, and there is no reference to any obligation to provide collateral in 
the event of a fall in the market value of the underlying securities. The latter 
obligation was disclosed only in the 2007 filing after such obligations were 
called in. In its filings for 2002‒06, AIG quantified the ‘fair value’ of its non-
credit derivatives portfolio and identified them as ‘the maximum potential loss’ 
that could be suffered by the company. But no equivalent figures were 
provided for its credit derivatives. No reference is made to procedures such as 
the monitoring of risk by the Derivatives Review Committee or seeking 
approval from the Credit Risk Committee. In the 2007 filing, AIGFP, which had 
been described the previous year as ‘a specialized business, distinguishing 
itself as a provider of super senior investment grade credit protection’ 
(Vasudev, 2009 citing AIG Annual Report for 2006, p. 34), declared a 
staggering loss of $11. 5bn but with no further comment. A more sombre note 
is struck in the statutory filing for 2007 where there is an acknowledgment of 
that ‘AIG’s risk management processes and controls may not be fully effective 
in mitigating AIG’s risk exposures’ (Vasudev, 2009, p. 18). This admission 
rather casts doubt on whether those formal controls had been even minimally 
effective in the preceding years when no reference was made to them in 
AIG’s filings. These doubts are further fuelled by the apparent boilerplate of 
the 2007 filings’ reference to ‘review and oversight committees to monitor 
risks [and] set limits’ (ibid.) as the expression of this commitment is ‘not 
materially different from the perfunctory discussion of the management 
structure of the Financial Services division in the filing for 2002’ (ibid.). 
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<A>Conclusion 
 
With hindsight and the benefit of many post-mortems, it is becoming apparent 
that the financial meltdown of 2008 was the product of a ‘perfect storm’ of 
mutually reinforcing elements that, somehow and perhaps conveniently, went 
long undetected by those – economists (see Lawson, 2015, Chapter 6) but 
also investors and regulators – who profess expertise in the field of finance. In 
addition to sanctioning incautiously low interest rates, there was injudicious 
de-regulation, the transformation of investment banks from partnerships into 
proprietary companies,12 the creation of highly complex financial instruments 
(e.g. CDOs) based upon ahistorical models, a reduction of the regulatory 
minimum capital required under Basel Accords, complicit rating agencies and 
auditors, flat real wages for many low and middle earners who sought to boost 
their income by borrowing against rising paper asset values, excessive 
leveraging by financial institutions, the use of mark to market accounting, 
avaricious executives and supine directors and, last but not least, 
accommodating models and practices of corporate governance. 
When reflecting upon the preconditions and on-going unfoldings of the 
global financial crisis, attention was focused earlier on a rather obscure, if 
consequential, policy intervention, in the form of the Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA). When tweaked by the Clinton administration, it unintentionally 
fuelled a rapid expansion and normalization of the subprime mortgage market 
as lenders were strongly incentivised to become responsive to previously 
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‘redlined’ applications. Combined with the partial repeal of Glass–Steagall, the 
Clinton tweak proved to be a thin end of a very large and unsteady wedge that 
contributed to the unprecedented destabilization of the US housing market 
and inadvertently prized open the flood-gates through which flowed a liquid 
wall of money accelerated by the growing use of securitization. 
It was not just the Clinton tweak that inflated the sub-prime mortgage 
bubble but, rather, the mutually amplifying interconnectedness of a boom in 
this market and the securitization of sub-prime mortgages. The exponential 
growth of CDOs was a condition as well as a consequence of a seemingly 
limitless supply of credit. Operating within a neo-liberal regime fuelled by 
interest rates held artificially low, AIG embraced a conception of corporate 
governance geared to the maximization of shareholder value. The company 
complied formally with many vaunted features of corporate governance while 
it undertook ‘a multi-billion dollar CDS business free from regulatory filings, 
mandated capital requirements, and government intervention’ (Sjostrum, 
2009, p. 989). 
The ‘new growth model’ created business opportunities that offered 
quick wins, big bonuses and minimal personal risk. These were seized upon 
by the investment banks and AIG to expand the scale, complexity and reach 
of their operations. The beneficiaries were the smarter investors, and most of 
the bankers and traders who collected their capital gains and dividends, 
salaries and bonuses prior to the meltdown. Traders and executives, like Joe 
Cassano and Martin Sullivan, made hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses 
and pay-offs by piling up debts that taxpayers bailed out. Who were the major 
losers? Some of them were employees of financial institutions and their 
 40 
shareholders. But the majority were, and continue to be, ‘ordinary’ citizens 
and taxpayers – present and future. For years to come, the ’99 per cent’ will, 
in a variety of ways, be paying off the loans used to recapitalise financial 
institutions – institutions that had, in response to market-based incentives 
promoted by ‘the new growth model’ and its favoured, agency-theoretic 
conception of corporate governance, become too complex to manage, too 
powerful to regulate or break up, as well as ‘too big to fail’. 
Compounded by further debts incurred to counter the worst effects of 
the economic slump in economic activity following the meltdown, the prospect 
for most of the losers is a continuing deterioration in the provision of public 
services, increases in regressive taxes (VAT), cuts in social benefits and 
further degradation in the terms and conditions of employment (zero-hours 
contracts, erosion of employment security, reduced pensions, and so on), 
especially for those employed in the public sector. To justify such austerity, 
which is of greatest benefit to elites who are in a position to capitalize on 
others’ distress (e.g. by acquiring public assets at knock-down prices), the 
debt is ascribed to excesses in public spending prior to the GFC when, 
arguably, it is a consequence of the unsustainability of the debt-fuelled ‘new 
growth model’ that elites now seek to rekindle (see Knights and McCabe, 
2015). In the absence of concerted and determined efforts to discredit the 
model and replace it with a less socially divisive alternative, efforts to 
restructure and reform the governance of the financial sector are unlikely to 
result in more than cosmetic, weak and piecemeal reform. 
As the impact of the meltdown becomes more widely felt, the losers 
may be prompted by their plight to reflect upon the role and credibility of the 
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key financial institutions that remain in place, and now assume responsibility 
for the restoration of the financial system. Amongst them is the International 
Monetary Fund which in 2006, a year before the credit crunch occurred, 
confidently trumpeted the benefits of securitization (see opening quotation). 
Now, in 2015, the mandarins in the IMF are at least calling for a shake-up in 
banks’ bonus-heavy pay structures and incentives that ‘encourage excessive 
short-term risk-taking’ (Donnan and Fleming, 2015; see also Johnson, 2015). 
The IMF is also warning that the financial sector in the US and other 
advanced economies is still too big and continues to allow banking systems 
and financial systems to grow faster than its regulation can monitor (see 
Donnan and Fleming, 2015). But the IMF lacks the capacity and the mandate 
to do more than make calls that political and financial elites are at liberty to 
note but ignore, or simply disregard. 
At the heart of a broken system is a shareholder-value model of 
corporate governance (Deakin, 2011) that since the crises, as Bainbridge 
(2012) shows, has been shored up, rather than challenged or substantially 
reformed. Reforms have generally ‘empowered shareholders’, rather than 
strengthened the governance role of other stakeholders, which ‘make(s) the 
next crisis more likely and potentially more severe’ (ibid, p. 13). It is 
improbable that shareholder-centricism will be remedied without radical and 
sweeping regulatory interventions by national and global governments. It is a 
view shared by Greenberg, the deposed CEO of AIG, who attributes much 
responsibility for the company’s collapse to a shareholder-centric model of 
corporate governance that was unchecked after his departure. As he puts it, 
and with specific reference to the post-Enron era, the collapse of AIG followed 
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a disasterous reconstitution of the AIG board which occurred in response to a 
‘national campaign for “shareholder democracy”’ (Greenberg and 
Cunningham, 2013, p. 158). The avowed intent of the campaign was to curb 
the abusive exercise of power by executives. But, in Greenberg’s eyes, the 
empowerment of shareholders was incapable of holding his successor 
properly to account (ibid., p. 158; see also p. 159). Indeed, Greenberg’s 
successor, Martin Sullivan, and his fellow board members eagerly pursued 
the short-term shareholder value by recklessly permitting the expansion of 
revenues from AIGFP, thereby enabing the company to reach, and even 
exceed, its 15/15/15 targets. This hugely enriched AIG executives who were 
subsequently ‘let go’ with impunity. That said, it was Greenberg who had set 
up the 15/15/15 metric that shareholders assumed could be indefinitely 
delivered. 
Meaningful reform of the system requires, as Howson (2009, p. 50) 
notes, radical change that encompasses ‘prudential regulation by public 
authorities’ but this is feasible only if the banks and insurance companies are 
broken up so that they are small enough to fail as well as simple enough to 
audit and regulate. In the case of AIG – as Willumstad, who chaired the board 
before becoming its CEO, acknowledges but apparently lacked the time, 
capacity or will to address – the size of the company and its labyrinthine 
complexity made it very difficult to monitor and control (see Boyd, 2011, pp. 
174‒6). Identifying much more wide-ranging reforms of corporate governance 
is one way to rebalance the distribution of benefits and costs arising from the 
financial sector. In the absence of such reform, established political and 
financial elites can be expected to ‘push back’ at any minor tightening of 
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control (e.g. over mortgage lending), as is evident in the US where the efforts 
by a coalition of banks and republicans have repeatedly been directed at 
loosening the criteria for qualified mortgages through the proposed 
introduction of an alternative, market-based standard (see Jopson and 
McLannahan, 2015). The GFC has highlighted the ‘limits of private law’ 
(Howson, 2009, p. 50) that is at the centre of neoliberalism, yet it remains in 
place because powerful vested interests are presently well served by it. 
Paradoxically, resistance to closer, more effective and publicly accountable 
global, as well as national, regulation of corporations and markets makes it 
more likely that profit-seeking activities will result in systemic collapse. 
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<A>Appendix A Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
 
CDOs are a form of bond whose complex structure was developed in the world of corporate debt. The 
first CDO was issued in 1987 but it was the late-1990s before they became established. By 2004, the 
global issuance of CDOs had reached $154bn and this increased rapidly to $520bn in 2006. In 2009, the 
global issuance of CDOs fell to $4bn. Mortgage-based CDOs have different risk classes comprising a 
number of tranches (junior, mezzanine, senior and super-senior) that offer different rates of return that, in 
the case of the most junior, high risk tranches can be at least 12 per cent and as high as 15‒20 per cent 
(see figure below). 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mortgage_backed_security.jpgSS (retrieved on 3 May 2016). 
 
<QM> 
If you took a million subprime mortgages, sliced ’em up, and shuffled the pieces around into 
smaller, seemingly random groups, you’d get CDOs – collateralized debt obligations. The idea 
was that they lowered the risk involved, which allowed for AAA ratings. It was all modeled on a 
mathematical formula called the Gaussian copula function, which looked something like this: Pr 
[TA< 1, TB< 1] = F2(F−1 (FA(1)), F−1 (FB(1),) g). By 2006 some $4.7 trillion in CDOs had been 
sold. But there was just one small, tiny, little problem with the formula: it was based on 
“correlation,” meaning you could predict the future by looking at the past. And in this case, the 
gamma function – g – was deduced from projections that house prices would continue to rise 
indefinitely, at the same rate as they had in the recent past. Obviously, they didn’t. Which is 
why, when the first subprime mortgages began to default, the whole crazy apparatus that held 
up our financial high-wire act came tumbling down. 
(Feirstein, 2009) 
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<A>Appendix C 
 
<A>Appendix B The Wonders of Securitization 
 
In November 2003, when speaking on behalf of the American 
Securitization Forum to the ‘Hearing on Protecting Homeowners: 
Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit’ 
at the House of Representatives, Cameron L. Cowan, a Partner 
of Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe, LLP, declared that: 
<QM> 
The success of the securitization industry has helped 
many individuals with subprime credit histories obtain 
credit. Securitization allows more subprime loans to be 
made because it provides lenders an efficient way to 
manage credit risk…Regulation that seeks to place 
disproportionate responsibilities on the secondary market 
will only succeed in driving away the capital loan 
purchasers provide in the subprime market. 
He continued: 
<QM> 
I urge Congress to move with great care as it addresses 
the problem of predatory lending. The secondary markets 
are a tremendous success story that has helped 
democratize credit in this country. Well intended, but 
overly restrictive, regulation in this area could easily do 
more harm than good. 
 
Source: http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/110503cc.pdf 
(retrieved 3 May 2016). 
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<A>Notes 
                                            
1 This was reflected in the dramatic removal, within days of the election of a New Labour administration in 1997, of 
control of the base rate from the direct influence of politicians. A monetary policy committee, comprising five senior 
Bank of England executives and four experts selected by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, took responsibility with 
the objective of keeping inflation under 2.5%, principally by adjusting the base rate. This focus upon inflation is 
perhaps understandable in the UK context where it is so strongly associated with the traumas of stagflation and 
industrial conflict attributed to the diluted Keynesian policies of the 1970s. 
 
2 The reference here is to a character created by Harry Enfield, a comedian, in 1986, the year of Big Bang. See 
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/loadsamoney (retrieved 3 May 2016). 
 
3 The boom was punctuated by occasional ‘blips’ and `bumps’, such as the financial crisis in South East Asia in 1997 
and the slowdown when the dot.com bubble burst in 2000. But it was the collapse of Long Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) and the scandal of Enron that most clearly foreshadowed, and signalled warnings of the risks of 
securitization, including the use of financial models, at the heard of the global financial crisis. 
4 It has been alleged that rating agencies routinely awarded investment grade status to tranches of CDOs 
constructed out of mezzanine or junior tranches from other CDOs. That is to say, the investment banks (e.g. 
Goldman Sachs but they were quickly imitated) are said to have gathered together the junior and mezzanine 
tranches of CDOs, and then ‘persuaded the rating agencies that these weren’t, as they might appear, all exactly the 
same things. They were another diversified portfolio of assets!…The rating agencies, who were paid fat fees by the 
firms for each deal they rated, pronounced 80% of the new tower of debt (i.e. new CDO) triple-A [top investment 
grade’ (see Lewis, 2010, p. 73). To illustrate the point, it has been reported that Moody’s, one of the rating agencies, 
downgraded a top, super-senior tranche of a mortgage backed CDO given an AAA rating in April 2008 to a rating of 
B2 in November of the same year (MacKenzie, 2009). 
5 An increase to 0.5 would have made CDOs significantly less attractive in comparison to gilts and corporate or 
government bonds receiving an equivalent investment grade rating. 
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6 An Alt-A grade, for example, means the claimed income or other key information of the borrower might not have 
been verified. 
 
7 As an aside, Republicans rattled by the meltdown have identified the CRA as the (Democratic) source of the ‘sub-
prime crisis’. 
 
8 AIG’s labyrinthine complexities and opacity – paralleled by Enron (Willmott, 2011) – resulted, in part, from an 
acquisitions spree that included International Lease Finance Corporation, the market leader in aircraft leasing and 
also SunAmerica leading provider of life assurance, savings products, annuities and mutual funds in addition to its 
biggest US insurance competitor (American General Insurance). 
 
9 This point was not lost on David Schiff in his 1993 article ‘Swaps and Derivatives: AIG Hits Hyperspace’. Schiff 
subsequently highlighted a number of other dubious AIG dealings, including a reinsurance deal called Coral Re 
involving the giant Canadian Brewer Molson Companies whose CEO coincidentally joined the AIG board shortly 
afterwards, as well as Brightpoint that paid AIG about $15m in monthly premiums to retroactively cover an imaginary 
loss. AIG then made a payment of $11.9m that enabled Brightpoint to overstate its earnings by 61 per cent and so 
conceal the scale of its unanticipated losses. As Boyd (2011, p. 109) notes, this deal was remarkable since AIG 
allowed a longstanding subsidiary to risk the reputation of the company for a few million dollars in premium. It turned 
out to be even more remarkable when Schiff discovered that the ‘Loss Mitigation Unit’ of the subsidiary was openly 
advertising its services on AIG’s website. For this, AIG was penalized $10m by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. According to Boyd (2011, p. 110), Greenberg, the CEO of AIG, ‘seethed at what he saw was the lack of 
proportion shown by the SEC and to an extent his board, who expressed displeasure to him in no uncertain terms’. 
This was to become a recurrent theme of Greenberg’s attitude to regulators (see Braithwaite, 2015) and ‘disloyal’ 
members of the AIG board. 
A similar scam was undertaken in 2001 to provide banks with balance sheet relief. This was available 
though a product termed Contributed Guaranteed Alternative Investment Trusts (C-GAITS). Although Ernst & Young 
were initially content to suggest that these instruments were congruent with accounting standards, they withdrew this 
advice but AIG continued to market this product without drawing clients’ attention to the potential accounting risk. By 
offloading $762m in three separate C-GAITS deals, PNC Financial Services Group was able to report a 52 per cent 
higher net income, for which AIG received $39.21m in fees (see www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18985.pdf 
retrieved 26 March 2015). The SEC settled for payment by AIG of $126m, and this was a ‘deferred prosecution’ to 
indicate that no one would be indicted so long at AIG complied until January 2006. This had a depressing effect upon 
the share price and further spooked the board. As even a pro-Greenberg board members is reported to have said of 
this period: “No one thought that Brightpoint and PNC were the only deals that were [problematic]. The company was 
making money but we weren’t sure where the next headache might come from’ (Boyd, 2011, p. 117). 
 
10 When Cassano’s contract was terminated in 2008, no attempt was made by AIG to recover any of his 
compensation. Indeed, he was allowed to retain up to US$34m in uninvested bonuses and negotiated a US$1m per 
month retainer (see www.propublica.org/article/former-aig-exec-at-center-of-meltdown-got-paid-millions-for-little-
work-101. Retrieved 24 July 2015). 
 
11 The deal involved obtaining a loan of $500m from Gen Re, which looked as if it was a payment to reinsure an 
equal amount of risk but was deployed to improve a decline of $59 m in AIG’s general reserves that had sliced off $6 
from its $99 share price. 
 
12 The transformation of investment banks from partnerships into proprietary companies is important as it transfers 
risk, as well as reward, to shareholders. With this change, executives (no longer partners) have less direct personal 
interest in understanding and supervising risk; and they also find themselves under greater external pressures to 
maximise profitability. 
 
